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Abstract  
The representation of Middle Eastern women in Western scholarship in 
particular has been critiqued in post colonialist and feminist scholarship for 
its racist underpinnings embedded in broader colonialist constructs. This 
rich body of scholarship has contributed to a paradigmatic shift in how the 
“woman question” is addressed in Western academic engagement with 
women in the Middle East. This article, however, interrogates whether the 
counter-narratives have created new binary constructs in their 
representations of women’s agency whose impact has been detrimental to 
local feminist struggles for gender equality. It explores the problematics of 
using an analytical framing that disassociates expressions of women’s 
collective agency from the gender equality agenda and its implications for 
coalitional work by looking at examples from the early 20th century as well 
as in the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution of 2011.  
 
Keywords: postcolonial feminism, agency, Egyptian feminism, Muslim 
Brotherhood, Egyptian revolution 
 
Introduction 
Challenging essentialist, reified, stereotypical representations of women’s 
identities has been a focus of extensive feminist scholarship. The 
representation of Middle Eastern women in Western scholarship in 
particular has been critiqued by feminists, drawing on the seminal work of 
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Edward Said, for its racist underpinnings embedded in broader colonialist 
constructs. Feminist and post-colonial scholarly endeavours to challenge 
these power hierarchies have assumed many forms including: exposing 
the disconnect between transnational feminist enterprises and women’s 
realities on the ground (Abu-Lughod, 2013; El Mahdi, 2010); critiquing 
Western normative assumptions informing interpretive frameworks for 
understanding women’s expressions of agency (Mahmood, 2012); and 
celebrating what are considered alternative framings of women’s agency 
(Osman, 2003; Maumoon, 1999; Cooke, 2001).  
 
These three strands of work have contributed in major ways to a 
paradigmatic shift in how the “woman question” is addressed both in 
discourse analysis as well as in empirically based work. This article, 
however, interrogates whether the counter-narratives have created new 
binary constructs in their representations whose impact has been 
detrimental to local feminist struggles for gender equality. The article does 
not attempt to engage with the many complex and nuanced contentions 
made in this rich scholarship. Rather, drawing on representations of 
women’s identities and roles in Egypt at two historical junctures, it makes 
two propositions on how this work has affected constructs of local feminist 
agency and gender equality struggles.  
 
The first proposition put forward by the author here is that unpacking the 
genealogy of binary constructs of the indigenous/Western, pious/secular 
suggests that their foundation lies not only in Western ideological projects, 
but also in nationalist and Islamist political projects. This paper argues that 
while the former binary of indigeneous/Western served to re-enforce 
Western supremacy, the latter binary of pious/secular served not only to 
enforce patriarchal privilege but to actively mobilise for the destruction of 
local Egyptian feminist agency. The second proposition is that while 
women’s agency cannot be reduced to accountability for contributing to 
or undermining the women’s rights agenda, it cannot be entirely 
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disentangled from it either. The argument here is that examining the 
myriad expressions of women’s collective agency independently of their 
impact on women’s rights in a country more broadly is highly dangerous 
in justifying or overlooking policies and practices that circumscribe 
women’s rights.  
 
The article commences with unpacking essentialised identities and how 
they particularly apply to the case of Egypt. It explores the conundrum of 
displacing one hegemonic regime of truth whilst avoiding creating another 
that also creates supremacies that are destructive in and of themselves. In 
the second part, I will look more specifically at the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB)’s discourse on local feminist movements, and binary constructions 
and implications for gender equality struggles in the earlier parts of the 
20th century. In the third part, I will examine another struggle - a century 
later - following the Egyptian revolution of 2011, around what a new social 
contract should entail for gender justice. I will explore the problematics of 
using an analytical framing that disassociates expressions of women’s 
collective agency from the gender equality agenda and its implications for 
coalitional work.  
 
Interpretive Frameworks for Challenging Essentialised Women’s 
Identities: Opportunities and Pitfalls 
There is a rich literature unpacking the power dynamics inherent in 
essentialised and reified constructs of identity. Anne Phillips highlighted 
four distinct meanings of essentialisms in her seminal work Gender and 
Culture (2010). The first form of essentialism attributes certain 
characteristics to all individuals subsumed within a particular category, e.g. 
all women are caring. It is the kind of essentialism that produces 
stereotyping of individuals. The second type of essentialism is the 
reification of attributes of a group for example where culture becomes the 
‘explanation of everything members of a culture do or say’ (Phillips 2010, 
p. 77). The third form of reification is in creating new categories to counter 
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the first two kinds of essentialisms inadvertently overlooking difference 
within. This would apply to forms of feminism which, in a bid to challenge 
gender hierarchies, entailed collective organisation around championing 
“women’s interests” without recognising the intersectionality of identities 
and agendas. For example, the assumptions that underpinned a certain 
kind of feminism that was informed by the Western, heterosexual white 
middle class woman, without recognition of how differences across class, 
religion, race, and sexuality diverged from this. The fourth kind of 
essentialism is a more totalising kind, which entails policing of a particular 
category. Such an essentialism treats its supposedly shared characteristics 
as defining ones which cannot be questioned or modified, e.g. are you 
really a feminist when you believe in x or y etc. (Phillips 2010, p. 81). At all 
of those moments when you are told you are not ‘really’ Indian/working-
class/a feminist/a Trotsyist/whatever, there is a kind of categorical 
coercion at work. You are being refused your own self-definition because 
you lack some attribute deemed an essential component of the category 
you have tried to claim, explained Phillips (2010, p. 81) by way of example. 
In challenging binary constructs and their reified underpinnings, it is the 
third kind of essentialism that we see at work in the case study below - 
how in the bid to challenge essentialisms about women in the Middle East, 
new ones were created that overlooked the intersecting identities and 
agendas at work at the local level.  
 
The rich body of work from feminism and post-colonialist studies has 
cumulatively contributed to a number of important inroads in how we 
approach the complex subject of identities and relationships in various 
contexts, most importantly, the need to avoid reified identities, binaries of 
“us and them” and their corollaries such as Northern versus Southern, 
Western versus Eastern and the central importance of reflexivity in 
interrogating our normative framings and their methodologies. However, 
in this article I interrogate whether these important scholarly inroads, as 
enriching as they are, have created other new problematic binaries and 
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categorisations. The intention here is neither to “undo” the displacement 
of earlier Westocentric (and in some cases racist) constructs of women’s 
agency in the Middle East, nor to downplay these constructs’ continued 
significance for Western settings, in which some groups have attacked 
Muslims and Arabs. It is, however, to press for recognition of, firstly, how 
they have contributed directly or indirectly to another form of reification, 
that of the vilification of local feminist individuals and organisations as 
‘Western, elite, secular, disconnected’ by local power holders opposed to 
women’s rights in contexts such as Egypt (and other contexts as evident 
from this volume). Second, the case study here exposes how the well-
meaning Western scholarly paradigmatic shift that highlighted the positive 
contribution of pious women’s movements has ignored the question of 
accountability outcomes for gender equality locally.  
 
Perhaps a good place to start is the author’s standpoint and its implications 
for epistemological approaches to the case studies presented here. This 
author identifies herself as an Egyptian feminist. By feminist, I mean I am 
politically committed to redressing intersecting inequalities along the lines 
of gender, class, religion, geographic background and other identifiers that 
entrench power hierarchies which distort our humanity and perpetuate 
injustices. From a positionality point of view, this has given me access as 
an insider with feminist individuals, organisations and campaigns, enabling 
me to undertake both formal and informal interviews, be privy to internal 
documents, and engage in activities as a participant observer (see Tadros, 
2016). In engaging with representatives from Islamist movements, I have 
been able to undertake formal interviews as well as have access to a vast 
amount of secondary literature on thematic issues, narratives on the 
history of the movement and the country, as well as some of the sources 
of instruction shared with the rank and file (see Tadros, 2012). I have also 
been treated as an outsider, however, especially on account of being a 
non-Muslim (Coptic) woman, for example, blocking my participation in 
religious instruction classes in the mosques or in internal member 
Feminist Dissent 
 
 
62 Tadros. Feminist Dissent 2018 (3), pp. 57-87 
 
meetings of Islamic movements. Consequently, my analysis here is not so 
much on the institutional dynamics within both movements vis-à-vis 
questions of expressions and pathways of agency, rather it is more specific 
to the relationship between representations of binary framings, political 
projects and gender equality outcomes. The pitting of the secularists and 
religionists has taken different forms. The first a framing of the grassroots, 
authentic versus a Westernised/elitist. For example, in Do Muslim Women 
need Saving, Abu-Lughod (2013) contrasts the priority issues of local 
feminist organisations in Egypt with those of women in a poor rural 
context that she visits. She perceives of these feminist organisations as 
corollaries of Western transnational feminist networks. In Cairo, she notes, 
 
the women’s rights industry creates careers, channels funds, inspires 
commitments, gives credibility to new actors, creates and disrupts 
social networks, and legitimizes intellectual and political frameworks 
and ideals. Women’s rights provide a conduit for foreign 
intervention and government involvement in ordering the daily lives 
of both the middle classes and those at the margins. (Abu-Lughod 
2013, p. 171).  
 
That some women’s (and human rights) organisations have suffered from 
a focus on policy at the expense of building local constituencies is 
undoubtable (Tadros, 2016). That there has been a struggle in the use of 
language and framings of justice issues is also a very valid critique (ibid). 
However, in the bid to challenge Western hegemonic political projects or 
what she terms the “new gender orientalism”, Abu-Lughod creates a new 
binary, that of the authentic versus elitist.  
 
The problematique with that is its creation of two monolithic categories 
that do not exist on the ground. Women in rural contexts hold varied 
positions on gender justice issues and they are very differently positioned 
along lines of class, geographic location, education and religion. In Do 
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Muslim Women Need Saving, intersectionality is so missing that one is not 
even made aware that Coptic women exist in Egypt. It also puts all 
women’s rights organisations in Cairo in the same basket, again negating 
their diversity in political orientation, grounding, positioning and 
relationship with the West (Al-Ali, 2000).  
 
The same creation of binaries in a bid to challenge Western hegemony can 
be used in the construct of the secular, feminist versus religious feminist 
or woman of faith. Feminists are assumed to be secular and are pitted 
against Muslim feminists/Islamic feminists or women of faith more 
broadly (Osman, 2003; Maumoon, 1999). That there are ideological 
differences between some women who mobilise for example under the 
Muslim Brotherhood and some who work through rights-based 
organisations is undeniable, however, as will be discussed below, this does 
not clearly translate into a secular/anti-religious versus a pious/religious 
stance.  
 
One of the ways in which some Western-based scholars have sought to 
challenge earlier binary framings premised on the supremacy of Western 
normative conceptions of selfhood and subjectivity is through exploring 
multiple expressions of agency. In examining piety movements, Mahmood 
asserts that ‘it is quite apparent that this particular strand of the Islamist 
movement is only marginally organized around questions of rights, 
recognition and political representation’ (Mahmood 2012, p. 193). 
Mahmood challenges readers not to ‘assume that all contemporary social 
movements find their genesis in a politics of identity and should be 
analysed as responses to the juridical language of rights, recognition and 
redistributive justice’ (Mahmood 2012, p. 193). Mahmood’s thesis is 
premised on a critique of the feminist epistemology of exploring women’s 
agency in the context of Islamist movements such as the mosque 
movement. The challenge, discussed below, is that both historically and 
contemporarily, the mosque movement founders have had highly 
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developed positions on issues of rights, recognition and redistributive 
justice. The question is whether in such a situation, it is possible to 
disentangle their interests and agenda from the broader gender equality 
struggles.  
 
What is argued below, is that while agency cannot be reduced to gender 
interests, its collective exercise has implications for gender equality 
outcomes. When these outcomes are reflective of local struggles and 
influence policies, discourses and practices that affect whole populations, 
then we cannot ignore the question of accountability. At the most general 
level, accountability refers to the process of holding actors responsible for 
their actions (Fox, 2007; Joshi, 2007). This involves ‘answerability’, usually 
formal processes in which actions are held up to specific standards of 
behaviour or performance. However, accountability here is used to refer 
to the process of understanding outcomes in terms of responsibility of 
different stakeholders for the advancing of particular agendas. Hence, in a 
context such as Egypt, discussed below, the kind of accountability 
outcomes under exploration are those associated with answerability of 
actors for the agendas they advance. This should in no way be understood 
in prescriptive terms, i.e. a list of requirements against which actors are 
made answerable for their agendas. Rather, it is about unravelling the 
power struggles occurring around gender agendas in any context and 
exploring how the different political interests and policy influencing 
pathways contribute to, or undermine, equality outcomes. Such power 
struggles are historically and contextually specific and must be examined 
as such.  
 
Troubling the Genealogy of Binary Framings of Women’s Identities in 
Egypt 
In Politics of Piety, Mahmood discusses her ethnographic experience as a 
participant observer from 1995-97 in the mosque movement in Cairo. 
While she dissociates the mosque movement from the Muslim 
Feminist Dissent 
 
 
65 Tadros. Feminist Dissent 2018 (3), pp. 57-87 
 
Brotherhood, she traces its genealogy to two key Brotherhood leaders. 
The first, Hassan El Banna, is the founder of the mosque movement and its 
first Supreme Guide. Mahmood notes that El Banna harnessed the power 
of da`wa [prosletisation, or call to God] through mosques to counter what 
he perceived to be the unsatisfactory religious education offered by the 
`ulama (scholars). As for women’s involvement in the mosque movement, 
Mahmoud traces the growth of all-women learning circles to the spiritual 
godmother of the Muslim Brotherhood, Zeinab el Ghazali. In analysing the 
contemporary mosque movement, Mahmood seeks to challenge feminist 
reductionism that does not give credence to the complexity of women’s 
agency within mosques. Yet inadvertently she creates another binary, that 
of Western interpretive framings that are by default antithetical to 
religious agency and the piety movement which is grounded in a particular 
expression of religiosity. ‘ 
 
What is at stake in Western critiques of Islam, in other words, is not 
simply a question of ideological bias, but rather these critiques 
function within a vast number of institutional sites and practices 
aimed at transforming economic, political, and moral life in the 
Middle East. (Mahmood 2012, p. 191).  
 
What is missing from this critique, however, is the counter narrative about 
feminist agency as framed by the founders of the mosque movement. In 
the early 20th century, the power struggle over “the woman question” in 
Egypt involved various actors drawing on different sources of legitimacy. 
The political cohort known as the liberals in Egypt comprised parties and 
figures along both the left and right and their position on women’s rights 
varied. Similarly among nationalists, there were some who were the most 
vehement opponents of the Egyptian Feminist Union and its founder Huda 
Shar’awi while others were occasional allies in supporting their demands 
for greater equality (or less injustice). The Muslim Brotherhood played a 
major role in influencing the national debates and policy directions with 
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respect to the status and role of women in Egypt. The writings of Hassan 
El Banna provide critical insights on Egyptian feminism, and gender 
matters in public and private lives. It is pertinent that the first (formal) 
Egyptian feminist movement (the Egyptian Feminist Union, 1923) and the 
Muslim Brotherhood (1928)1 were established within just five years of 
each other. One of the publicised campaigns of the Muslim Brotherhood 
became to counter the Egyptian Feminist Movement (Amin 2003, p. 1682). 
El Banna’s vision was of a universal movement that would promote a 
revival of the idea of an Islamic community whose political, social and 
economic directions were in line with Islamic precepts (Tadros, 2012). 
However, it is clear from the writings of El Banna that a key element of his 
vision for the instatement of a just and righteous Muslim society was 
teaching on gender identities and relations in private and public space.  
 
Hassan el Banna openly attacked local advocates of women’s rights as 
seeking to emulate the West, being blind to the physiological differences 
between men and women and its implications for gender division of roles. 
While Huda Shar’awi and the Egyptian Feminist Union were respectful of 
religion and many of their struggles for women’s rights sought to show the 
disconnect between Islamic Shar`ia and social practice (Badran, 2005), 
nonetheless, they were consistently vilified by the Muslim Brotherhood as 
enemies of Islam. El Banna called advocates of women’s equality 
downright liars if they denied that a woman’s primary role is in the home, 
taking care of her husband and raising her children and doubly liars if they 
failed to recognise the value of marital union as the oldest union on earth 
(El Banna, 1944 in Amin 2006a, p. 250). In a chapter dedicated to ‘the 
Brothers and women’s issues’, Amin shares writings which warn that,  
 
the influence of the proponents of women’s liberation has grown, 
through the stirring/guidance of the Crusader and Jewish 
imperialism in order to destroy the Muslim family and society in its 
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entirety from within, to enable their onslaught onto the Muslim 
Ummah [nation] (2003, p. 165).  
 
Amin decries champions of women’s liberation as impious, sexually 
immodest, areligious destroyers of families.  
 
The existence of the women’s liberation movement became a driver for 
an anti-feminist mobilisation bent on challenging what they believed the 
movement stood for. The Brothers launched a movement to emphasise 
the importance of a woman’s place being at home, the necessity of veiling 
and gender segregation and blocking any proposals to reform personal 
status matters.  
 
The Muslim Brotherhood were relentless in countering this ghastly 
plan [of women’s liberation] that destroys society from inside, so 
they warned the Ummah of its evils, exposed its goals, and tried to 
remove these thorns from the path of the Muslim woman (Amin 
2003, p. 175) 
 
In an article in the Muslim Brotherhood weekly newspaper Al Ikhwan Al 
Muslimoun (El Banna, 1935 in Amin 2006a, pp. 238-41), El Banna tells 
Eastern women that they have two paths to choose from: ‘that of the pious 
Muslim woman or the immodest Western woman who mingles [with men] 
in the markets and streets’. The binary framing serves the political function 
of delegitimising Egyptian feminists.  
 
The context of this framing was El Banna’s attack on the Egyptian Feminist 
Union for attending the 1935 International Alliance of Women Conference 
in Istanbul. At this conference Huda Shaarawi was selected vice-president 
of the International Alliance of Women and presented her own critiques 
of Western feminism (Badran, 1995). While the Egyptian Feminist Union 
initiated large-scale campaigns against colonialism in Egypt and 
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imperialism in the region and challenged Western feminists to condemn 
their governments’ policies in the region in particular towards Palestine, 
none of this was recognised in El Banna’s writings. For Egyptian women to 
have challenged patriarchal gender hierarchies automatically relegated 
them in the eyes of the Muslim Brotherhood to the category of Western 
corollaries.  
 
Hassan El Banna addresses ‘those who call themselves advocates of the 
women’s cause’ (Amin 2006a, p.. 237), accusing them of being ‘imposters, 
deceivers, fighting a non-war, playing with phrases, you are taking as your 
opponents those who are the true guardians of this issue…’ (Amin 2006a, 
p. 248). Presenting them as opponents to Islam, he then proceeds to 
explain that they are either ignorant that all women’s rights are 
guaranteed in Islam or are not faithful in adhering to its precepts (Amin 
2006a, p. 248). In the latter part of the article, he asks a rhetorical question 
to,  
 
those who demand for women [right to] work, office and vote: don’t 
they agree with us that the prime place for a woman is her home and 
the most noble of her missions is to form a family, raise it and build 
the Ummah? If they say no, then you are lying a thousand times 
[over]. (Amin 2006a, p. 250).  
 
The casting of men and women who championed women’s rights as 
enemies of religion was from the perspective of the Muslim Brotherhood 
as legitimate guardians or upholders of Islam.  
 
Yet in practice Huda Shaarawi and many other feminist leaders engaged 
with Islamic leaders and sought to widely disseminate enlightened 
interpretations of Islam by learned scholars. Amin recounts that the 
Muslim Brotherhood sent a complaint to King Farouk of Egypt when they 
heard that Sheikh Moustapha Abd el Razek, an Alazharite scholar and the 
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then Minister of Islamic Endowments, attended a party at Huda Shaarawi’s 
house. Amin was outraged that Abd el Razek would be in a place where 
there was a ‘combination of girls and women who were Muslim and non-
Muslim, foreigners and non-foreigners, saferat,3 with mixture of men’ 
(Amin 2006b, p. 204). The Brothers had been advocating against gender 
mixing, and against women’s instigation of cultural events and salons. 
However, what is interesting in this case is the reference to the mixing with 
non-Muslim, presumably Egyptian women, as perhaps indicating another 
level of digression. The Brothers considered an Islamic scholar interacting 
with women as an affront to Islam itself. For Amin, the danger was that 
such women would be associated with an Islamic leader in the minds of 
the public and that became a major driver for seeking the King’s 
intervention in punishing the Minister of Islamic Endowments. The action 
intended to confirm that even when women’s rights champions seek 
Islamic authority, they should be denied the legitimacy that comes from 
drawing on Islam and its symbols. 
 
Mahmood has challenged us to extricate our conceptualisations of 
women’s agency exclusively from the prism of rights and equality. 
Epistemologically, this is a welcome endeavour since it challenges us to 
reflectively think about our normative standpoint and the biases and 
assumptions that it wields. However, if we were to engage with women’s 
collective agency as an actor whose agenda and policy-influencing work 
directly or indirectly affects the local struggles for gender equality, then 
we cannot disassociate agency from accountability for women’s rights. 
Hassan el Banna was not engaged in a doctrinal exercise about what an 
ideal Muslim society should look like, he and the Muslim Brotherhood 
were active in seeking to shape policy in Egypt. For example, while the 
Muslim Brotherhood recognised women’s right to a particular kind of 
gender appropriate education, they consistently blocked every policy 
measure put forward to expand women’s rights in Egypt. When Naema al 
Ayoubi obtained her law degree and the Lawyers Syndicate refused her 
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application for membership (on grounds of her gender), El Banna 
commended the syndicate for their wisdom. When Fatmah Fahmi 
obtained her high school certificate and applied to join the Faculty of 
Engineering, and her application was rejected, again he congratulated 
them and the Minister of Education for protecting the public good against 
those who do not respect the natural division of labour between men and 
women (El Banna, 1933 in Amin 2006b, pp. 227-29).  
 
In 1944, Zoheir Henry MP’s proposal to parliament to grant women 
suffrage was rejected. Hassan el Banna vociferously attacked the proposal 
saying that women’s place is at home and any energies spent on the 
electoral process should be for the education of men on their 
responsibility to vote (El Banna, 1944 in Amin 2006b, p. 249).4 When 
women were allowed to enrol at Cairo University, the Muslim Brotherhood 
launched a campaign to prohibit women from entering higher education 
institutions and to create parallel learning institutions whose curricula 
would be more suited for their gender roles (Amin, 2003; 2006a).  
 
Collective agency, whether pious or otherwise, has a consequence for 
gender equality outcomes. Amin’s account of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
campaigning against the women’s rights movement indicates a high level 
of policy engagement, involving writing letters to the King, to parliament, 
to sympathetic MPs and ministers as well as grassroots mobilisation. It was 
both a proactive policy of educating men and women of gender relations 
and responsibilities but also reactive, seeking to block any policy that 
would enhance women’s rights.  
 
The above historical account is significant for narratives that have sought 
to challenge Western essentialisms and biases in three major ways. First, 
the omission of Islamist movements such as the Brothers’ vilification of 
local feminist movements from such narratives creates a highly distortive 
narrative. It negates the experiences of local women’s rights activists in 
Feminist Dissent 
 
 
71 Tadros. Feminist Dissent 2018 (3), pp. 57-87 
 
engaging with such hostility and locally-led campaigns to delegitimise 
them through attacks on their personal integrity and allegiances. Second, 
the negation of the Brothers’ own political appropriation of framings that 
label women’s rights activists as agents of imperialism in Western 
scholarly narratives that challenge gender orientalism, leads to a selective 
engagement with hegemonic political projects, ignoring that spearheaded 
by Islamist movements. Third, it fails to recognise how scholars’ own 
narratives collude with that of local Islamist movements in undermining 
local feminist agency. While this is not to suggest that academics who have 
inadvertently created a binary of an orientalist West versus locally 
authentic Islamic women have colluded with the Muslim Brotherhood to 
undermine local Egyptian feminist movements, it is to say that there is an 
unfortunate convergence in the two discourses. The impact of 
disentangling women’s collective agency from the broader gender 
struggles experienced at a national level are equally glaring when 
exploring another critical juncture in the history of Egypt, the 
revolutionary phase associated with the ousting of President Mubarak in 
2011.  
 
Women’s Agency and Accountability for Gender Equality in 
Revolutionary Times: The Litmus Test 
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(Streets of Cairo during 2011 Revolution, March 2011. Photo: Ali Atef.) 
 
The ousting of President Mubarak in 2011 through a people’s revolution 
opened the floodgates of citizen activism through social movements and 
political parties across right, left and centre. Irrespective of how historians 
retrospectively appraise the democratic potential in 2011, it represented 
for the people a historical juncture full of opportunity for establishing a 
new order. Across the spectrum of different political groups of women (Al-
Ali, 2000), there was intense mobilisation around influencing on women’s 
rights, the gendered nature of the constitution, the future of the National 
Council of Women (the national machinery formerly headed by Suzanne 
Mubarak, the First Lady5), and the new legislature (2012).  
 
Against the political ascendency of the Muslim Brothers to power in Egypt 
in 2011, informally, and more formally in 2012, it became possible to 
examine first, what notions of equality are advanced when Islamists are 
empowered to shape policy and practice, and second, what opportunities 
present themselves for coalition-building across ideological divides. Prior 
to the Muslim Brotherhood’s political empowerment in Egypt after the 
2011 revolution, some scholars (Abdel-Latif and Ottaway, 2007) suggested 
that the movement may be propelled towards reforming its position on 
gender. Like all movements, there is always a dynamic interface between 
context, the political moment and internal dynamics influencing internal 
institutional politics.  
 
For a number of historical and contextual reasons too complex to capture 
here, the political scene following the ousting of President Mubarak 
became highly divided along several axes politically and economically. 
With respect to gender equality issues the political fault-lines were deeply 
polarised between two groups: an “Islamist” camp comprising various 
Islamic movements who held varying positions on gender roles and rights, 
and a non-Islamist camp (often called a secularist camp by the Islamists) 
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who were highly differentiated on economic and political issues. During 
this period (2011-2013), the mosque became a space for political 
mobilisation of Islamic groups of different political orientations. For 
example the Muslim Brotherhood had a stronghold on particular mosques, 
the Salafis others, the jihads yet another set. As Mahmood did not mention 
the names of the mosques in which she undertook ethnographic work in 
Cairo (and they probably represent a very minute percentage of the total 
number of mosques in the capital city anyway), it is impossible to examine 
the political affiliation of the women who studied in these mosques after 
the revolution. However, at a national level, there is evidence that the 
Muslim Brotherhood relied on the mosque frequenters, women and men, 
who though not being formal members of the Brotherhood were seen as 
sympathisers (mohebeen) for political mobilisation during that period 
(Tadros, 2017). The suggestion here is not that all women who frequent 
mosques for religious instruction would have become supporters of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, only that it is impossible to dismiss the inevitability 
that there would have been some in this category on account of the broad 
historical trajectory of the country at that juncture.  
 
There were a number of issues around which the fault-lines on gender 
between the Islamist and non-Islamist camps became ossified, perhaps 
the most acute being around how gender relations and issues were framed 
in the new constitution symbolically (gender sensitive language) and 
substantively (articles defining women’s rights). Other issues included the 
nature of gender-related legislation during the short-lived Egyptian 
parliament (January 2012-August 2012) as well as the official Egyptian 
governmental stance on the theme of gender-based violence in the 
Commission on the Status of Women of 2012. Women leaders of all 
political persuasions sought to influence the framing of a new social 
contract for Egypt on political, economic and social issues. A number of 
female members of the Muslim Brotherhood rose to the highest echelons 
of its political party established in 2011 - the Freedom and Justice party 
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(FJP) - and in its government, after Dr Morsi assumed presidency in June 
2012 (Tadros, 2017). Feminists organised into coalitions to present their 
vision of a new contract, with particular respect to gender justice issues. 
However, an analysis of the political coalition-building and alliance forming 
strategies pursued between 2011-2013 does not point to any major 
political campaign or theme around which women belonging to the 
Muslim Brotherhood and feminists joined forces. Both camps vilified each 
other, and the ideological and political polarisation became acute.  
 
(Protestor in Cairo during 2011 Revolution, February 2011. Photo: Ali Atef.) 
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Hatem suggests that contrary to the narrative critiquing the Muslim 
Brotherhood for their gender ideology, the only piece of legislation they 
issued when in power was one protecting the rights of female-headed 
households through medical insurance (Hatem, 2013). The promulgation 
of this legislation represented a positive policy measure that responded to 
a real need experienced by poor, economically disadvantaged women, 
divorced, abandoned by their husbands or widowed. It is also 
commendable that in drafting the constitution of 2012, a similar article 
was introduced stipulating that ‘The State shall provide special care and 
protection to female breadwinners, divorced women and widows’.6 
Hatem suggests that the Muslim Brotherhood’s gender agenda reflected 
their sensitivity and awareness of the economic needs of vulnerable 
women which was disregarded by elite feminists and the media intent on 
vilifying the movement (Hatem, 2013). Hatem’s framing suggests a clear 
binary distinction between feminists who pursue an elitist agenda focused 
on political rights versus women of an Islamist orientation who are more 
focused on bread and butter issues facing economically excluded women. 
Yet in reality, it was feminist organisations who had lobbied for decades 
for state recognition of the rights of female-headed households and for 
comprehensive national policy on social transfers, legal aid and medical 
insurance (Bibars, 2001). The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood-led 
authorities advanced such a policy both in parliament and inscribed it into 
the constitution was highly commendable, but its genealogy lay in feminist 
policy-making demands of the 1990s, well before its uptake in 
Brotherhood social policy.  
 
The broader gender strategy that was rolled out by the Muslim 
Brotherhood in practice sought to entrench gender hierarchies cementing 
male privilege. The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists capitalised on the 
deep hatred that Egyptians held for the First Lady (Suzanne Mubarak) 
seeing her as responsible for Mubarak’s downfall, to call for a repeal of 
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legislation that they had objected to during Mubarak’s tenure by 
representing it as ‘Suzanne’s laws’ (El Sadda, 2012). For example, they 
lobbied for a change in family legislation to repeal the right of the mother 
to have guardianship over her children’s education, on account of its 
violation of the Shar`ia. In July 2011, Al-Azhar, the highest Sunni Islamic 
authority that issues legal opinions endorsed their call. The Brothers 
launched a campaign to press for Egypt’s abdication of its commitments 
to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) and the Children’s Convention on account of their 
violation of the Shari’a. Leading MPs in the 2012 parliament, such as Azza 
Garaf, openly advocated for a de-criminalisation of female genital 
mutilation as inscribed in the Child Law that was passed in 2008 during 
Mubarak’s reign.7 She argued that the matter should not be regulated by 
legislation but left to personal choice and medical opinion (interview 2012 
in Tadros, 2016). Other leading members of the Muslim Sisters of the 
Muslim Brotherhood interviewed insisted that this was only her personal 
opinion and that the FJP did not put forward any proposals to parliament 
of this kind (interview 2012 in Tadros, 2016). However, even though 
decriminalisation legislation was not officially presented to parliament, 
informally, the Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP was endorsing the practice. For 
example, the FJP mobile health clinic due to visit the village of Abou Azziz 
in Minya, announced among its services ‘circumcision for males and 
females for LE30 a case’. The Muslim Brotherhood denied they ever 
provided such a service but the flyer announcing the mobile health clinic’s 
arrival suggests that at the very least there was an intention to provide it 
(Tadros, 2016).  
 
In 2013 the Muslim Brotherhood sent its own representative to the 
Commission on the Status of Women to denounce the document against 
violence against women that the UN had put forward that year.8 The 
Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement condemning the Agreed 
Conclusions on account of their incompatibility with the specificity of the 
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needs of Muslim women and their destruction of family values. This 
created a major rift with women’s rights groups in Egypt who protested 
that the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance did not represent them (El Sadda, 
2012).  
 
Ironically, both feminist and Islamist women’s groups have shown a 
greater ability to engage in transnational solidarity with other women’s 
groups than amongst themselves locally. This is highly significant in 
challenging the binary representation of feminist women drawing on 
transnational solidarity whilst Islamist movement women focus exclusively 
on local stakeholder engagement and bonding. El-Mahdi (2010) describes 
as a participant observer the emergence in 2005 of an initiative called 
‘Women for Democracy’ which brought together women from across the 
ideological spectrum (Islamist leaning and secular leaning) in order to link 
women’s subjugation to pro-democracy demands. She suggests that the 
fault-lines between Islamists and non-Islamists were so deeply entrenched 
by unhelpful binaries such as the authentic versus Western, the universal 
versus local that they led to the speedy dissolution of this initiative. El-
Mahdi (2010) identifies the failure of local secular feminists to recognise 
the potential for coalition building with Islamist leaning women around 
common agendas as the cause behind weak mobilisation around gender 
interests. She particularly holds secular feminists to account for the 
demise of the initiative, first for their inability to view their Islamist peers 
as partners rather than foes and second, for seeking solidarity with 
international feminist networks rather than looking ‘inside’ for joint action 
(El-Mahdi 2010, pp. 395-6).  
It is true that Egyptian feminists have extensively drawn on solidarity with 
transnational feminist platforms for advancing a pro-equality agenda 
(though not uncritically). However, it is also true that women belonging to 
the Muslim Brotherhood have drawn on transnational alliances and 
solidarities to advance their gender agenda. Though the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a movement has a strong anti-Western ideological 
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standpoint, they have chosen on occasion to forge alliances with American 
evangelical pro-family groups to counter transnational feminist platforms 
in the international arena (pers comm Camellia Helmy 2006). Heba Rauf 
Ezzat, a highly respected thinker9 notes that the vision of women who 
endorse an Islamic framework has more in tune with the New Right 
activists as a counter reaction to feminism (Maumoon 1999, pp. 278-9). 
On matters pertaining to the family (and against women’s equality), and 
on sexuality and reproductive health, the Muslim Sisters have found more 
in common with conservative evangelical Christians than with local 
feminists and activists in Egypt. This challenges the contention that the 
absence of a local ideologically cross-cutting platform that brings together 
Islamist women and feminists is because the latter prefer prefer 
international solidarity over local coalition-building (El-Mahdi, 2010). It is 
clear that the Muslim Sisters and Islamist women have also sought to build 
support around a gender agenda at an international level as well. By 
challenging any simplistic binary constructs of local feminists being 
outward looking and local women Islamists being inward looking, it 
becomes possible to explore the wide array of ways in which organised 
movements make strategic choices about where, when and how to 
mobilise. This applies as much to Islamic women’s mobilisation as it does 
to their feminist counterparts, be it regionally or internationally.  
 
Conclusion 
The rich scholarship exposing and challenging orientalist interpretive 
frameworks is to be credited for creating a paradigmatic shift in 
essentialist constructs of women’s agency in the Middle East. This article, 
however, has argued that other totalising binary constructs need to be 
exposed and contested if we are to avoid replacing one hegemonic regime 
of truth with another. Much of the literature critiquing scholarly, media or 
policy representations of women’s agency in the Middle East rest on 
exposing the normative biases of feminisms towards Islamist movement 
women. In this article I have reversed the inquiry to interrogate how 
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Islamic movements frame local feminists and women’s rights struggles by 
exploring one archetype of Islamist movements, the founder of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and his representation of local women’s struggles in 
the 1920s and 1930s. The article has argued that the binary constructs of 
feminists as Western, anti-religion and elitist versus non-feminists as 
authentic and religious can be genealogically traced back to the work of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. By failing to interrogate the Islamist movements’ 
own constructs of binary framings, some feminist scholarship enforced the 
same tendency to create reified identities that its critique of orientalism 
had sought to challenge. The negation of binary constructs in Islamist 
movement literature served to obfuscate another hegemonic political 
project - an element of which was the vilification of local feminist 
struggles. This deliberate or inadvertent oversight of the confluence of the 
binary framings of orientalist critiques and those of movements such as 
the Muslim Brotherhood meant that the hegemonic political project of the 
West was exposed, but not the political project of the Islamists. Such an 
omission had a major detrimental impact on the representation of local 
feminist agency which has had to contend with the double whammy of the 
vilifying discourse of both the Islamists and Western scholars.  
 
The second contention made in the article is that when both Western and 
non-Western scholars, policy makers and activists represent feminists as 
secular (proxy for anti-religious) and Islamists as religious (proxy for pious), 
they distort a complex reality in which these categorisations are often 
artificial. The Egyptian Feminist Union sought to represent itself as aligned 
with, and emanating from, its Muslim roots, thereby challenging the binary 
framing of secular/Western versus religious, authentic framed by El Banna 
and other leading figures of the Islamic movement. The binary construct 
depicting women’s rights organisations in Egypt as being outward-looking, 
forging alliances at a transnational level whilst Islamist-leaning 
movements operate on a national/local level has also been empirically 
questioned.  
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While it is true that many feminists groups in Egypt draw on CEDAW as an 
instrument of appraisal - one that is clearly secular - it is also true that they 
have drawn extensively on religious and cultural repertoires. Conversely, 
while it is true that the Muslim Brotherhood has positioned itself as the 
guardian and upholder of Islam, this has not deterred the Muslim Sisters 
from publicly allying themselves with conservative Western Christian 
evangelical forces at key international events. El-Mahdi and Abu-Lughod’s 
(2011) critique of some Egyptian feminists as elite and lacking in grassroots 
constituencies is to a certain extent well-founded. However, caution is 
needed not to generalise about feminists and women’s rights activists in 
Egypt. By engaging in the reification of local feminists, such scholarship is 
feeding into the misrepresentation of feminism by Islamist leaders, 
starting from the rhetoric of Hassan el Banna to that of the Brotherhood’s 
contemporary leadership.  
 
The third contention has been to empirically interrogate the 
epistemological approach proposed by Mahmood to disentangle the study 
of women’s collective agency from the broader gender equality agenda. 
On the one hand, it would be highly reductionist to reduce women’s 
collective action to the women’s rights agenda. As the wide array of 
literature has shown, women may exercise their collective agency to 
pursue a wide range of issues, underpinned by different visions. An 
interpretive framework that exclusively explores women’s collective 
agency in terms of gender rights may overlook broader contextual 
dynamics that are critical for understanding accountability outcomes. For 
example, authoritarian regimes may endorse women’s rights while 
showing no accountability for the broad spectrum of rights that enable 
women to exercise their agency, individually or collectively (Tripp 2013, p. 
515). On the other hand, when women’s collective action influences the 
expanding or circumscribing of women’s rights, it becomes 
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epistemologically problematic to disentangle agency from accountability 
for equality agendas.  
 
The case study selected by Saba Mahmood (2013) to make the plea for 
epistemologically disassociating agency from rights epitomises this 
problematique. The very binary constructs premised on vilification and 
othering that Mahmood attributes to a Western political project are 
genealogically also prevalent in the early writings of the Muslim 
Brotherhood - a movement whose leading figures Mahmood 
acknowledges to be the founders of the women’s mosque movement. 
Stretching from the early days to the contemporary movement, the 
Muslim Brothers have established a dialectical opposition between 
platforms that press for more rights for women and their own as advancing 
a pious Islamic social, economic and political order. The Muslim 
Brotherhood’s ascension to power, albeit for a short period after the 
ousting of Mubarak, offered an opportunity to test the case that ‘rather 
than calling to change existing laws, Islamic feminists10 cry for a return to 
"authentic" Islam, so that both women and men can achieve their full 
potential’ (Osman 2003, p. 77). While the promulgation of a new law 
extending medical health care for female-headed households was a 
commendable policy, this was countered by a broader gender strategy 
that sought to maintain and deepen patriarchal power relations. Gender 
activism of Islamist movements as described by Abdel-Latif and Ottaway 
(2007) may have politically empowered its participants but their agendas 
served to advance policies and practices that entrenched gender unequal 
power hierarchies.  
 
While this paper engaged with a particular contextual and historical case 
study, its contentions are relevant for scholars examining the relationship 
between the dialectics of representation of women’s collective agency and 
gender equality in other settings. The first proposition is the importance 
of exploring the genealogies of the reification of identities. Historicised 
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and contextualised approaches to unpacking genealogies through situated 
narratives is key. This enables us to understand the nature of struggles and 
how the construction of binary frames serve as a function of advancing 
broader political projects. By examining the genealogies, it is possible to 
identify the wide array of actors involved in political appropriation of such 
constructs and how they change over time and space.  
 
The second proposition for future work in this area is the relationship 
between normative values, prescriptive framings and interpretive 
frameworks. This article has argued that feminist epistemological notions 
of clear articulation of standpoint and positionality are analytically useful 
in unpacking normative values and how they have affected the conceptual 
and methodological approaches to the topic. However, there remains the 
question of how to avoid normative values rendering prescriptive rather 
than analytically open frameworks. What has been proposed here is that 
examining agency in relation to the dynamic power struggles in which it is 
being exercised is critical, agency cannot be simply examined in terms of 
the vision and actions of those exercising it, it has to be relational to other 
actors in the same context.  
 
The third and final proposition relates to the relationship between agency 
and accountability in relation to women’s identity and gender equality. 
The article recognises the dangers of reductionist analysis that exclusively 
analyses women’s collective agency through the lens of women’s rights, 
and cautions against the enunciation of any simplistic linear causal 
relationship between women’s collective agency and accountability 
outcomes for gender equality. At any one point, gender equality outcomes 
can be attributed to a complex constellation of influences, some of which 
we can hold actors accountable for their roles and some of which are the 
unintended outcomes of a confluence of circumstances and dynamics. 
However, in exploring the plurality and richness of women’s collective 
agency, including those of non-feminist and anti-feminist women, it is 
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equally impossible to dismiss its influence on gender equality outcomes. If 
for example, one of the purposes of binary framings is to delegitimise the 
agency and struggle of local feminist actors, then inevitably there are 
accountability outcomes that cannot be overlooked. Nothing short of a 
paradigmatic shift is needed here - not to reverse the gains of exposing 
orientalism - but to recognise ways in which the creation of counter-
framings for challenging imperialist projects may inadvertently hurt local 
struggles for gender equality if they create new binaries and reified 
identities.  
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Notes 
1 The doctrine of the Brotherhood is addressed in Tadros, 2012 and marginally in 
Tadros, 2017. 
2 Gom`a Amin, a leading member and historian of the Muslim Brotherhood, oversaw 
the process of compiling, organising and publishing of the works of Hasan El Banna, 
including speeches, press articles and other writings. There are three key publications 
which are drawn on here extensively (Amin, 2003; 2006a) in which Amin draws on 
primary data from the writings of El Banna and Amin’s (2006b) compilation of El 
Banna’s writings from various newspaper and magazines on the subject of social 
reform: Min Tourath Al Imam El Banna Al Islah Al Ijtema’i.  
3 Saferat is the plural, singular is Safera, a word that is used to refer to non-veiled 
women, but has nuances of being exposed, of being sexually immodest.  
4 The information in this paragraph is corroborated by the Muslim Sister, Makarem el 
Deiry (pers comm. 2007). 
5 The author has been selective about which cases to present here on account of 
limited space. The struggle over the nature of gender rights, language and hierarchies in 
Egypt’s constitution is one that perhaps best epitomises the fault-lines between an 
Islamist camp and a non-Islamist one, however, it would not have been possible to 
capture its complexity and many nuances here. For further information on this struggle 
see Tadros, 2016.  
6 The introduction of this legislation was uncontroversial within the Muslim 
Brotherhood because it did not challenge power relations between men and women in 
any fundamental way and in fact was completely congruent with their overall 
paternalistic welfare policy (See Sholkamy, 2012 for a discussion of the latter). 
7 Female genital mutilation (FGM) or female circumcision as it is popularly called, 
involves the removal of the clitoris and part of the labia minora under the pretext that 
this will protect a girl’s chastity. FGM, although practiced for thousands of years, has 
been on the decline in the past decade thanks to a socially sensitive and nationwide 
campaign to show that FGM is neither religiously prescribed, nor linked to a woman’s 
moral behaviour. 
8 At the 57th session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in March 2013, 
the Commission issued a set of ‘agreed conclusions’ on the elimination of all forms of 
violence against women and girls which reiterated many of the principles highlighted in 
CEDAW and reinforced the message regarding a zero tolerance policy towards both 
private and public forms of gender-based violence. 
9 Though not an official member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Karam (2002) notes that 
Raouf was taught by leading Muslim Brotherhood figures such as Zeinab el Ghazai. 
10 While noting that the Muslim Sisters do not call themselves Islamic feminists, some of 
the figures that Osman mentions in her article do happen to be leading personalities in 
the Muslim Brotherhood.  
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